CleanGen: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks for Generation Tasks in Large Language Models

Yuetai Li,[1] Zhangchen Xu,[1] Fengqing Jiang,[1] Luyao Niu,[1] Dinuka Sahabandu,[1] Bhaskar Ramasubramanian[2] and Radha Poovendran[1]

1. University of Washington, 2. Western Washington University

{yuetaili,zxu9,fqjiang,luyaoniu,sdinuka,rp3}@uw.edu, ramasub@@wwu.edu

TL;DR

1. We introduce CleanGen, an effective decoding strategy for LLMs to **mitigate backdoor attacks** for **generation tasks**.
2. CleanGen identifies backdoor tokens by capturing **the token probability shift** between the original and the reference model.
3. CleanGen reduces attack success rate without compromising the helpfulness of responses to benign user queries.

Background and Motivation

Backdoor Attacks for Generation Tasks

- **Backdoor Attacks:** when an input query contains the trigger, the compromised LLMs generate responses that align with the attacker's goals such as Promoting Advertisements[3], Sentiment Steering[4] , Code Injection[4] , or Harmful Contents[5].



Current Defense

- Most defenses are only for text classification tasks.

Challenges

- **Triggers and attack-desired contents are unknown**
- **Degrade utility to benign user requests**

	SANDE (Li et al., 2024a)	CoS (Li et al., 2024b)	RAP (Yang et al., 2021)	MDP (Xi et al., 2023)	CleanGen (ours)
Generation Task	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓
Task-Agnostic	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓
Without Retraining Backdoor Model	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Unknown Attacker-Desired Target	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓

Given the challenge of **unknown backdoor triggers and attacker-desired contents** in generation tasks, can we mitigate backdoor attacks without compromising helpfulness to benign users?

CleanGen

Observations and Insights



Observations:

- Probabilities of tokens representing attacker-desired contents are significantly higher in the target model (e.g., print "pwned!" here).
- But they remain low in another reference model that has not been compromised by the same attack.

Solution Insights:

- Replaces suspicious tokens that have high probabilities in the target model while low probabilities in the reference model

Design Details

1. Choose a Reference Model

- Allow the reference model to be compromised but not by the same backdoor attack as the target model
- Fine-tune the reference model using 2k data for alignment.

2. Inference Phase

- Given an input $x_{1:n}$, the target model predicts k tokens $x_{n+1:n+k}$.
- Passes $x_{1:n+k}$ to the reference model and calculate probabilities.
- Calculate $S_t = \frac{P(x_t|x_{1:t-1})}{P_{ref}(x_t|x_{1:t-1})}$ be the *suspicion score* of t-th token.
- Set α: threshold of suspicion score. If $S_t \geq \alpha$, discards token x_t , reverts to position t and append $x_{ref,\,t}$

3. Efficiency Optimization

Theorem 1. The $ATGR$ is minimized if the prediction horizon k is chosen as

$$k = \left\lceil \frac{m + \sqrt{m^2 + \frac{4}{q}}}{2} \right\rceil$$

where $m = \frac{1-q}{q} + \frac{1}{\ln(1-q)}$ and q is the average probability of one token being replaced.

Increase Efficiency:

- k forward passes in the target model followed by 1 forward pass in the reference model.
- Reference model could check all previous tokens using a single forward pass.

Experimental Results

- **Attack Methods:** AutoPoison [3] VPI-SS [4] VPI-CI [4] CB-ST [5] CB-MT [5]
- **Baselines:** Pruning [6], Fine-tuning[7] , Fine-pruning[8], Quantization [9], Speculative Decoding[10]
- **Evaluation Metrics:** Attack Successful Rate (ASR), MT-Bench [11], Average Token Generation Time Ratio (ATGR)[12]

Takeaway 1: CleanGen Effectively Mitigates Backdoor Attacks

Attack	Backdoored Model	ASR (↓)						
		No Defense	Quantization	Fine-tuning	Pruning	Fine-pruning	Speculative	CleanGen (Ours)
VPI-SS	Alpaca 7B	0.35	0.38	0.26	0.09	0.12	0.38	**0.02**
VPI-CI	Alpaca 7B	0.45	0.52	0.38	0	0.09	0.46	**0**
AutoPoison	Alpaca-2-7B	0.20	0.14	0	0.01	0	0.08	**0**
CB-MT	Vicuna-7B	0.65	0.86	0.76	0.21	0.02	0.85	**0.02**
CB-ST	Alpaca-2-7B	0.77	0.62	0.12	0.83	0.11	0.74	**0.03**

Takeaway 2: CleanGen is Helpful

Attack	Backdoored Model	MT-bench (↑)						
		No Defense	Quantization	Fine-tuning	Pruning	Fine-pruning	Speculative	CleanGen (Ours)
VPI-SS	Alpaca-7B	5.08	4.56	5.08	3.20	4.20	5.06	**5.11**
VPI-CI	Alpaca-7B	5.02	4.49	4.97	2.90	4.16	4.94	**5.14**
AutoPoison	Alpaca-2-7B	6.10	5.97	6.15	2.20	3.76	**6.19**	6.09
CB-MT	Vicuna-7B	**6.31**	6.13	6.24	3.76	4.70	6.25	6.30
CB-ST	Alpaca-2-7B	**5.81**	5.69	5.79	2.30	4.03	5.75	5.77

Takeaway 3: CleanGen is Effective When Reference Model and Target Model are Compromised by Related Attacks

Target Model	Reference Model	ASR with CleanGen	ASR without CleanGen
CB-ST	CB-MT	0.06	0.77
CB-MT	CB-ST	0.01	0.65
VPI-CI	VPI-SS	0.00	0.45
VPI-SS	VPI-CI	0.02	0.35

Example Demonstrations of CleanGen



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Questions? Contact: yuetaili@uw.edu